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GOOGLE LLC V. CNIL: THE LOCATION-BASED LIMITS OF THE
EU RIGHT TO ERASURE AND LESSONS FOR U.S. PRIVACY LAW
Sam Wrigley* & Anne Klinefelter**
As the United States considers preemptive federal privacy law,
the discussion can be enriched by a reassessment of the EU example
as illustrated in a 2019 decision at the European Court of Justice.
The General Data Protection Regulation that took effect in 2018 is
often described as an important model for unifying and centralizing
data protection law in order to provide consistent protections of
rights. But the Google LLC v. CNIL decision highlights that the EU
law did not in fact create a monolithic system without room for
Member State variation.
This Article takes a close look at the way that the erasure right
is articulated in the GDPR, examining how competing rights are
balanced, how Member States’ different approaches to balancing
rights are accommodated, and how related provisions in the law
inform an understanding of the erasure provision in Article 17. This
Article also examines the 2019 Google LLC v. CNIL decision,
exploring the Court’s reasoning and the impact of the case on EU
erasure rights and beyond.
This Article draws on these examinations of the erasure-related
provisions of the GDPR and of the Google LLC v. CNIL decision to
advance a better understanding of how the influential EU
*

Doctoral Candidate at the University of Helsinki, Finland. Many thanks to
those who helped to improve this Article, including (but not limited to) co-author,
Anne Klinefelter, those at NC JOLT and the people at the University of Helsinki.
Any errors contained remain the fault of the authors.
**
Henry P. Brandis Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Law
Library, University of North Carolina. Thanks to my research assistant Shannon
Coy, my co-author Sam Wrigley, and Professor Päivi Korpisaari for inspiration
for this Article. Thanks as well to the Fulbright Finland Foundation, the Faculty
of Law at the University of Helsinki, and the UNC School of Law and Kathrine
R. Everett Law Library for generous support for my visit to Finland that led to
this article. Thanks to Christine Xiao and Lily Faulconer for helpful editing and
for an engaging symposium.

681

682

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

Regulation embraces the possibility of significant Member State
variation and ongoing balancing of data protection with expression
and information rights. Guiding principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality that are foundational to the European Union,
incorporated into the GDPR, and evident in the Google LLC v.
CNIL decision provide the basis for this national deference and
deferred balancing. Together, subsidiarity and proportionality
principles caution against extensive consolidation of privacy law
into a one-size-fits-all solution. The United States can learn from the
European Union that a monolithic and inflexible federal law may
not only be difficult to enact but also undesirable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet presents challenges for the territoriality of law.
Within EU data protection law, the right to erasure, also known as
the right to be forgotten, is challenged by borderless aspects of the
Internet. This right has developed in the context of internet search
engines, and the fact that personal name searches increase the
exposure of information protected by EU data protection law. The
EU erasure right can require that search engines de-index protected
personal information, but implementation can be seen as pitting
effectiveness of the remedy against jurisdictional authority given the
accessibility of different versions of search engines across legal
boundaries.1 Imagine that a French citizen without any aspirations
of fame or public office discovered that a Google search for their
name surfaced, for example, a long-ago arrest for charges later
dropped or a statement which the person made as a child. The
citizen, aware that EU law provides strong protections for limiting
the processing or control of personal information, may wish this
information to be removed from search results and so attempt to
exercise their right to erasure under the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”), Article 17.2
Assuming that the citizen can successfully show one of the
grounds for erasure, Google (if it wished to try to do so) would then
have to assert that its processing was nonetheless justified under one
of the permitted GDPR grounds, e.g., by showing a countervailing
right of expression or of access to information. Absent a successful
assertion, any continued processing of that data by Google would be
in violation of the French citizen’s right to erasure. The French
citizen, however, may wish to go further than simply having the
information removed from the version of Google which targets
France and may want to have these search results banished from all
1

For a classic piece on the difficulties of law and the global internet, see Peter
Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice and Law and the
Internet, 32 INT’L. L. 991 (1998).
2
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter
the GDPR].
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versions of Google Search; they might not, for example, want this
information displayed to persons using the German or U.S. versions
of Google, nor to French persons who might stray from the French
version of Google Search to use another national version.
This question of territoriality, and the inherent questions of how
to provide effective data protection, were ones the French data
protection authority, la Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et
des Libertés (“CNIL”), faced, and its response was to assert that
de-indexing should happen in all versions of Google search
engines.3 One can imagine that some multi-national actors might
have acquiesced, if only to simplify compliance with a consistent
implementation in all services. But Google instead pushed back on
global implementation of erasure rights for search engines.4 Faced
with a question of how to interpret EU law, France referred the point
of territoriality of the erasure right under the GDPR to the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”).5
In the fall of 2019, in Google LLC v. CNIL,6 the ECJ delivered
a judgment finding significant location-based limits to the EU right
to erasure.7 The Court not only rejected the French authority’s
assertion that French citizens could automatically assert the right
worldwide, but also denied automatic pan-EU implementation of
these types of erasure claims.8 The judgment of the Court does not
provide perfect clarity on all the territoriality issues for erasure, but
it does offer important guidance for U.S. multinational actors and
several lessons for the United States as the need for broad
preemptive national privacy legislation is debated. To reach its
decision, the EU Court addressed one of the core complications of
privacy and data protection law—the tension between those rights
and the freedoms of expression and access to information.9 While
3

Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 30 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
4
Id. ¶¶ 31, 38.
5
Id. ¶ 39.
6
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
7
Id.
8
Id. ¶¶ 40–73.
9
See, e.g., id. ¶ 60.
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some of the GDPR represents conclusions about how to balance
these rights and freedoms, some of that hard work was explicitly left
for Member States to address through potentially varying national
laws and through procedures for harmonization that rely on
consultation among Member States’ designated data regulators.
These dual sets of balancing acts, for competing rights and
competing legal authorities, can be instructive to the United States
which struggles with the same tensions.
Scholars have already developed a body of work analyzing and
comparing forms of federalism in the European Union and in the
United States and comparing federal systems of privacy or data
protection law specifically.10 This Article advances that
conversation regarding how to balance freedoms and how to balance
national and state law using the example of search engine erasure
location-based limits recognized by the ECJ in the Google LLC v.
CNIL decision. This analysis is particularly salient given ongoing
discussions about the desirability of new omnibus-style federal
privacy or data protection law in the United States.11
This Article brings together an author from the United States and
an author from the European Union to analyze the 2019 ECJ
decision about the territoriality of the right to erasure and to consider
some lessons for the U.S. debate about potential omnibus federal
privacy legislation that would preempt an expanding set of state
10

See, e.g., THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaidis and
Robert Howse eds., 2003) (ebook) (examining and comparing federalism
principles and systems in the United States and in the European Union);
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV (James E. Fleming and Jacob T.
Levy eds., 2016) (ebook) (addressing U.S. federalism in law and government with
comparative analysis of European models); Paul Schwartz, Preemption and
Privacy, 111 YALE L. J. 902 (2009) (advising against broad preemptive federal
privacy law); Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 595 (2016) (noting benefits of state privacy law innovations).
11
See Omer Tene, GDPR’s Second Anniversary: Cause for Celebration and
Concern, INT’L ASSOC. OF PRIVACY PROS. PRIV. PERSPECTIVES BLOG (May 26,
2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdprs-second-anniversary-a-cause-for-celebrationand-concern/ [https://perma.cc/FU32-N8SN] (discussing the impact of the GDPR
including on U.S. law and observing “[o]ne of the thorniest policy issues
impeding the progress of U.S. privacy legislation is the scope and degree of
preemption of state privacy laws.”).
IN THE
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laws.12 Section II of this Article explores the Google LLC v. CNIL
judgment and its grounding in both EU data protection law and EU
law more generally as articulated by the ECJ consensus judgment.
Section III considers lessons for the United States regarding the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that shape the
backdrop for this erasure decision. The Article concludes with the
recommendation that the United States incorporate similar
moderating concepts as pre-emptive national legislation for privacy
or data protection is considered.
II. GOOGLE LLC V. CNIL: LOOKING TO CASE AND CONTEXT
A. Statute
The starting point for the right to erasure is set out by the GDPR,
Article 17(1), which states where one of the (closed list of) statutory
grounds applies, data subjects “shall have the right to obtain from
the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her
without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to
erase personal data without undue delay.”13 This right is positioned
as part of the EU’s protection of both privacy and data protection as
12

The conflation of privacy law with data protection law elides important
distinctions between the purpose, scope, and remedies for these interests. See Dan
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 486 (stating that privacy
is “an umbrella term” and mapping problematic activities that include information
collection, processing, and dissemination as well as intrusions and decisional
interferences); BART VAN DER SLOOT, THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION IN PLAIN LANGUAGE 40 (2020) (“Although the right to data
protection was initially still closely connected to the right to privacy, it has
gradually become an increasingly independent doctrine, especially in the
European Union.”); Sam Wrigley, The Mysterious Nature of Data Protection as
a Qualified Right: A Problem of Scope and Purpose? In Oikeuksia, Vapauksia ja
Rajoituksia: Viestintäoikeuden vuosikirja 2019, HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO,
OIKEUSTIETEELLINEN TIEDEKUNTA 127, 127–58 (Päivi Korpisaari ed., 2020).
This article does not attempt to resolve this definitional problem. Because the
related interests are generally referred to as “privacy” interests in the United
States, this article uses this term for U.S. law. Although the ECJ Court refers to
both privacy and data protection rights at various points in the Google LLC v.
CNIL decision, this article uses the term “data protection” to ground its analysis
in the EU data protection law that is interpreted in this case.
13
The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17(1).
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fundamental rights, as protected by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (“Charter”).14 However, neither these
fundamental rights nor the right to erasure exist in isolation. In
particular, the European Union also provides a Charter right
protecting the freedom of expression and information.15 Given the
obvious potential for conflict between these rights, it is unsurprising
that the GDPR, Article 17(3), which sets out the exceptions to the
right to erasure, contains an explicit exemption for processing
activities that are necessary to exercise one’s freedom of expression
and information under sub-paragraph (a).16
At first glance, the exception in Article 17(3)(a) is quite wide;
the statute states that the right to erasure “shall not apply to the
extent that processing is necessary for exercising the right of
freedom of expression and information.”17 However, Article
17(3)(a), by itself, is an incomplete picture for two reasons. First, as
will be discussed below, the EU’s obligation towards the balancing
of these competing rights does not begin with the application of
legislation; it must also be considered during the actual drafting of
EU law. It is therefore necessary to examine Article 17(1), which
sets down the conditions under which the right to erasure can be
imposed, in order to gain a fuller picture. Secondly, merely because
Article 17(3)(a) has the potential to suspend the application of
Article 17(1), this will not always be the case. It is therefore
necessary to examine how the two provisions actually interact.
It is also important to note that the GDPR contains a specific
provision which imposes a duty on Member States to “reconcile”
data protection with the freedom of expression and information
under Article 85.18 Because the obligation is on a Member State
level, the GDPR accepts that certain questions of freedom of
expression and information may vary from one country to another.
The exact way in which different Member States have implemented
14
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
[hereinafter The Charter]. Respect for private and family life, and the protection
of personal data are enshrined as separate rights under Arts. 7 and 8, respectively.
15
The Charter, supra note 14, at art. 11.
16
The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17(3)(a).
17
Id. at art. 17(3)(a).
18
Id. at art. 85.
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this provision will not be explored in this Article, but the mere
existence of this provision will be helpful to remember, as it makes
clear that the balancing of the right to erasure with the freedoms of
expression and information may play out differently, depending on
the specific countries involved.
1. Laying Down the Law
Under its legislative procedure,19 the European Union is required
to consider the impact of any proposed law on fundamental rights,

19

The European Union’s legislative procedure is primarily governed by the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
15, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], Part Six Institutional
and Financial Provisions, Chapter 2 Legal acts of the Union, adoption procedures
and other provisions. Under art. 289, the ordinary legislative procedure requires
that, inter alia, regulations are proposed by the European Commission and then
adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament. To help reach this
agreement, the ordinary legislative procedure includes a conciliation phase under
art. 294(10)–(12) and the various European Institutions will also have informal
“trilogue” meetings. For more, see EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, A GUIDE TO HOW THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CO-LEGISLATES UNDER THE ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE (2014). It is also worth noting that the European Ombudsman held a
strategic inquiry on the transparency of the trilogue procedure and found that there
were a number of shortcomings, including a lack of publication of documents.
EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN SETTING
OUT PROPOSALS FOLLOWING HER STRATEGIC INQUIRY OI/8/2015/JAS
CONCERNING THE TRANSPARENCY OF TRILOGUES passim (2016). While some
attempts have been made to improve access to these documents (see, e.g., T540/15 De Capitani v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2018:167), there is still
a long way to go (see, e.g., Gijs Jan Brandsma, Transparency of EU Informal
Trilogues Through Public Feedback in the European Parliament: Promise
Unfulfilled, 26 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1464 (2018) (scrutinizing the level of public
accountability in the EU legislative process and finding it fails to meet
requirements which undermines the legitimacy of the process)). Fortunately, as
the GDPR was a very high-profile piece of legislation, many documents from the
legislative process are available, but the amount of available information is far
from complete. See, e.g., 2012/0011(COD): Personal Data Protection:
Processing and Free Movement of data (General Data Protection Regulation),
EUR. PARLIAMENT LEGIS. OBSERVATORY, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.
eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2012/0011 [https://perma.cc/5JNH4J44] (COD) (last visited May 11, 2020) (containing a document gateway for the
GDPR).
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including those as expressed in the Charter.20 If doing so reveals that
the law in question may restrict a Charter right or freedom, that law
may only be passed if it complies with the requirements in the
Charter, Article 52, which states that “any limitation” on such rights
and freedoms must “respect the essence of those rights and
freedoms,” be “subject to the principle of proportionality,” be
“necessary,” and “genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and
freedoms of others.”21
As can be seen from a GDPR trialogue document,22 Article 17
was subject to significant variation and debate during the EU
legislative procedure.23 While much of the content of the discussion
is not available, it is known that, inter alia, the consequences for the
freedom of expression was a live issue during the debate in the
Council stage of the legislative process.24 During that stage, the

20

Under the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306)
1 [hereinafter TEU], art. 6, the Charter has the “same legal value” as the EU
Treaties. The practical consequence of this is that the European Union cannot pass
any legislation which violates the Charter and therefore any such legislation is
outside of the European Union’s competences and so invalid. See also the Charter,
supra note 14 at art. 51 (requiring EU Institutions to have “respect the rights,
observe the principles and promote the application [of Charter rights] thereof in
accordance with their respective powers.”
21
The Charter, supra note 14, at art. 52.
22
Regulation (EU) No XXX/2016 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation),
trialogue 4-Column Table (2016), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/
en/data-protection/product-details/20120514CDT45071 [https://perma.cc/ULV62KGU].
23
Id.
24
As noted supra note 8, the EU legislative procedure suffers somewhat from
a lack of transparency. In particular, there is no consistent release of legislative
debates throughout EU Institutions; while the European Parliament releases
reports of its debates in European Parliamentary Debates, the Commission and
the Council do not do so. That is not to say that there are no resources available;
the Council does live-stream its debates and publish minutes and agendas, and
both Institutions publish summary documents and reports (e.g., the Council’s
Common Positions or Statements of the Council’s Reasons, and the

690

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

Council noted that, in relation to Article 17(1)(a), the Commission
had “emphasised that its proposal was in no way meant to be a
limitation of the freedom of expression.”25 It is therefore reasonable
to assume that, at least to some extent, the EU legislative bodies
have attempted to fulfill their task of balancing the right of data
protection against the freedom of expression and information while
drafting Article 17(1), even before reaching the exception contained
in Article 17(3)(a).
If, for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the European
Union has properly performed this balancing test, then it can also be
assumed that, at least in theory, Article 17(1) has already been
balanced such that it will not permit erasure where that would leave
the freedom of expression and information inevitably and
unjustifiably restricted.26 What, then, is the role for Article 17(3)(a),
and why is this secondary balancing act required? In order to analyze
the provision fully, it is first necessary to consider the scope of
Article 17(1). This paragraph states that a data subject shall only
have the right to obtain erasure if one of the following grounds exist:
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes
for which they were collected or otherwise processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based
according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2),
and where there is no other legal ground for the processing;
(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1)
and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the
data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2);
(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed;

Commission’s Communication documents). However, the level of detail in and
utility of these sources can vary dramatically.
25
Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General
Data Protection Regulation), revised and consolidated draft, Interinstitutional
File: 2012/0011 (COD), 15395/14 (2014), 102 et seq.
26
If this were found not to be the case and the provision were found to
contravene the Charter’s balancing requirements then it could simply be
challenged and found invalid under the TFEU, arts. 263 and 264.
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(e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal
obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is
subject;
(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of
information society services referred to in Article 8(1).27

This new, statutory implementation bears some welcome
differences from the right to erasure as formulated by the ECJ in
Google Spain,28 which was based on the now-repealed Data
Protection Directive (“DPD”).29 The case, now being somewhat
infamous, may need little introduction, but it is valuable to make
some notes before continuing. In particular, the Court in Google
Spain did not claim to invent the concept of erasure; rather, the right
in that specific case was treated as being the logical consequence of
two provisions in the DPD, being Article 12 (titled the “Right of
access”) and Article 14 (titled “The data subject’s right to object”).30
In particular, Article 12(b) gave data subjects the ability to demand
“as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this
Directive.”31 In the specific facts of the case, the relevant personal
data was being processed under the grounds of legitimate interest
and, under Article 14(a), data subjects also had the right to “object
at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his
particular situation to the processing of data relating to him.”32 In the
ECJ’s judgment, once such an objection had been appropriately
made, the data could no longer be lawfully processed, and Article
12(b) must therefore allow appropriate erasure of the data.33
On one level, this judgment should not be considered
particularly controversial; the law explicitly said that data subjects
27

The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17(1).
Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD) (C-131/12 Google Spain SL), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
29
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
[hereinafter the DPD].
30
C-131/12 Google Spain SL, ¶¶ 66–82.
31
The DPD, supra note 28, at art. 12(b).
32
Id. at art. 14(a).
33
C-131/12 Google Spain SL, ¶¶ 66–82.
28
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were entitled to erasure where appropriate, and that they have a right
to object to certain types of processing.34 It makes considerable sense
that the former should follow from the latter as, if the data were not
erased, an objection would become effectively meaningless.
However, Articles 14 and 12 both contained significant wiggle room
for interpretation. For example, Article 14(a) required a “justified
objection” and Article 12(b) only permitted erasure where
“appropriate.”35 It is therefore not surprising that the ECJ spent
several paragraphs emphasizing that such erasure requests must
involve a weighing up of the various competing interests, including
the freedom of expression and information.36 Equally, nobody will
have been shocked that soft-law guidance was issued by the Article
29 Working Party37 as to the implementation of the decision which
attempted to offer aid for controllers who were confused by the
ambiguities arising from the decision.38 Fortunately, given the
differences between the GDPR and the right as described by Google
Spain, it is not necessary to go into the impacts of these
uncertainties—rather, it is sufficient to note the contrast between the
two implementations and to bear in mind the potential implications
of the fact that the right to erasure is now considerably more specific
and specified.
2. Article 17(1)(b)–(e): Unlawful Processing and Erasure as Remedy
Returning to the GDPR, it is important to examine the individual
grounds for erasure before considering the potential impact on the
freedom of expression and information. Of the grounds, five of the
sub-paragraphs in Article 17(1), specifically (a)–(e), relate either
34

The DPD, supra note 28, at arts. 12(b), 14(a).
Id. at arts. 12(b), 14(a).
36
C-131/12 Google Spain SL, ¶¶ 80–87.
37
The Article 29 Working Party was an EU-wide body made up of, inter alia,
representatives from the Data Protection Authorities of each Member State that
offered authoritative soft-law interpretations, guidance and opinions on data
protection issues. The DPD, supra note 28, at art. 29. The body has now been
replaced by the European Data Protection Board, which is governed under the
GDPR, Chapter VII, Section 3.
38
ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION JUDGMENT ON “GOOGLE SPAIN AND
INC V. AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS (AEPD) AND MARIO
COSTEJA GONZÁLEZ” C-131/121, WP225 passim (2014).
35
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directly or indirectly to illegal or unlawful processing.
Consequently, erasure in such cases should not be considered as an
independent concept on its own, but rather as an effective remedy to
stop the unlawful processing. This position is similar to the spirit of
the DPD, Article 12(b), with the added advantage that most of the
grounds under the GDPR, Article 17(1)(a)–(e) are considerably
clearer; rather than a general concept of erasure where
“appropriate,” each situation seemingly already represents the result
of a balancing act between the rights of data protection and freedom
of expression and information as performed by the EU legislature.
Of these grounds, the easiest to examine are (b)–(e). Before
doing so, it is worth noting that the GDPR sets out a closed list of
justifications for the processing of personal data under Article 6 (for
most types of personal data) and Article 9 (for special category
personal data, such as health data or information relating to one’s
political or religious views).39 As a result, a controller can only store
that data if they have a legally accepted reason under Article 6 (for
non-special category data) or Article 9 (for special category data).40
Given this, it is not surprising that sub-paragraphs (b) and (c)
provide the ability for a data subject to demand erasure if no such
ground exists.41 Equally, sub-paragraph (d) allows for erasure if the
data is “unlawfully processed” and, as storing data is considered a
form of processing under the GDPR, it makes little sense that a
controller would be able to continue storing the data in such
circumstances.42 Finally, sub-paragraph (e) applies where retention
of the personal data would be contrary to an EU or Member State
law other than the GDPR; under such a case, the same consideration
(i.e., that retention of the data is unlawful, and therefore the
controller has no business retaining it) would apply.43 Under each of
these circumstances, the right to erasure, in many ways, operates not
as an independent right but almost as a de facto “remedy” for
correcting unlawful processing activities.

39

The GDPR, supra note 2, at arts. 6(1), 9(1)–(2).
Id. at arts. 6(1), 9(1)–(2).
41
Id. at art. 17(1)(b)–(c).
42
Id. at art. 17(d).
43
Id. at art. 17(e).
40
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How, then, do these grounds interact with the freedom of
expression and information? Once the premise that the processing
of personal data is something that is governed by law has been
accepted, it must presumably also be accepted that, as part of this,
the law must make it unlawful to possess and process personal data
under certain circumstances. Where this has happened, it further
makes sense that data subjects should have the right to demand that
data that is unlawfully held is erased, or else such conditions become
effectively meaningless.44 In such cases, where the processing is
clearly unlawful, there may be little room for a case-by-case
balancing between the protection of personal data and the freedom
of expression of information. While one may argue that, e.g., the
storing of personal data should be permitted even if there is no
lawful justification under Article 6, the question would not be
whether the erasure in this particular case violates the freedom of
expression and information, but whether the general prohibition on
an unlawful nature of processing in such conditions violates that
freedom in the first place.
Importantly, even at this early stage, it is possible to see signs of
regional variance in the right to erasure. In particular, the GDPR,
Article 17(1)(e) allows for a slightly wider variation than the other
grounds discussed already as it can be used to require erasure on the
basis of laws passed by Member States.45 In all other instances, the
balancing act of fundamental rights is being performed by the EU
legislature but, where the law being used to justify the erasure is
44
One could, it is accepted, argue that the right to demand erasure is not strictly
speaking necessary and that instead the controller should be subject to damages,
with continued damages being available if the data continues to be unlawfully
processed. Equally, one could argue that the data subject’s direct intervention is
not necessary at all and that the situation is better dealt with by a regulatory or
supervisory authority, with data subjects merely filing a complaint or report, with
fines or other penalties being issued for continued processing. However, without
getting too philosophical about the various regulatory approaches, this can be seen
as simply a technicality and whatever the mechanism, the end result is the same:
that if law is to regulate the processing of personal data then there must be
circumstances where it expects the controller to delete the data and will take steps
to make this happen, whether directly through an erasure order or indirectly
through continued fines until the desired outcome is reached.
45
The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17(1)(e).
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passed by a national legislature, then this will not be possible.
Rather, it is presumably for the national legislature to consider the
possible impacts and balance the relevant rights. While this has the
same effect of depriving courts and enforcement agencies of any
discretion to apply Article 17(3)(a) in particular cases, one can
easily imagine a situation where a court in one Member State is
obliged to erase information, whereas a court in another is not.
Notably, in addition to the idea that different Member States may
reach different conclusions on the balancing test, Article 17(1)(e) is
limited to situations where the controller “is subject” to the legal
obligation, meaning that this provision presumably cannot justify
application in Member States where that national law does not
apply.
3. Article 17(1)(a) and (f): Introducing Judicial Discretion
While also technically dealing with unlawful processing,
sub-paragraph (a) does not necessarily fit into the same paradigm as
grounds (b)–(e). As the primary balancing test for these cases is
determined at a legislative level, they involve comparatively simple
questions at the enforcement level—is there still a legal ground for
processing, does a law require that data to be deleted, etc.? By
contrast, sub-paragraph (a) asks whether personal data is still
“necessary” for its original purposes.46
As with the grounds previously discussed, this provision acts as
an enforcement or effective remedy for other legal provisions. In
particular, it seems to best reflect the data processing principles
contained in Article 5(1), which states, inter alia, that:
Personal data shall be:
...
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not
further processing in a manner that is incompatible with those
purposes . . . (‘purpose limitation’);
(c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’);
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable
step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate,

46

Id. at art. 17(1)(a).
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having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are
erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’);
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of the data subject for no
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data
are processed . . . (‘storage limitation’) . . .47

These principles seem quite vague. However, Article 5(2) states
that controllers are “responsible for, and [must] be able to
demonstrate compliance with” these rules (the principle of
accountability).48 Further, Article 83 places violations of Article 5 in
the higher of the two possible bands for administrative fines.49 The
principle of accountability, the level of fines, and the fact that failure
to comply with these principles may lead to a successful erasure
request indicate that, although potentially vague, controllers must
take the data processing principles as a serious legal obligation.
Given the existence of these principles and the utility of erasure
as a way for data subjects to correct their violations then, as with the
grounds discussed above, the application of the right to erasure can
arguably be effectively operating as a remedy. Nevertheless, use of
“necessary” as the limiting factor seems to add significantly more
room for debate than under grounds (b)–(e), which function as
relatively simple “yes or no” cases. This ambiguity is enhanced by
the fact that the necessity is judged against the original purposes for
processing the personal data, which will be extremely fact
dependent and may itself also raise issues of ambiguity.
This issue of determining what is necessary has already raised
interesting issues in case law, albeit in a different form. One example
is the case from the High Court of England and Wales in NT1,50
where the Court was asked to remove search engine links which
related to past criminal convictions. The case involved two separate
claimants, one of whom (NT2) was granted erasure, while erasure

47

Id. at art. 5(1).
Id. at art. 5.
49
The GDPR has two bands for fines, the higher capped at €20 million or four
percent of total worldwide annual turnover from the preceding financial year
(whichever is higher), and the lower at €10 million or two percent of the same. Id.
at art. 83.
50
NT1 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) (Eng. & Wales).
48
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was denied to the other (NT1).51 In relation to NT2’s case, Justice
Warby found that NT2 had “frankly acknowledged his guilt, and
expressed genuine remorse,” that his conviction was spent, that
“[t]here is no evidence of any risk of repetition” (in part because he
had changed fields), and that “[h]is past offending is of little if any
relevance to anybody’s assessment of his suitability to engage in
relevant business activity now, or in the future,” and concluded that
“[t]here is no real need for anybody to be warned about that activity”
and ordered erasure of the information.52 By contrast, Justice Warby
said of NT1 that the information “has not been shown to be
inaccurate in any material way,” that while his conviction was
historic, it was “of such a length” that the claimant had “no
reasonable expectation that his conviction would ever be spent,” and
that “[h]e has not accepted his guilt, has misled the public and this
court, and shows no remorse over any of these matters.”53 Justice
Warby also noted that “[h]e remains in business, and the information
serves the purpose of minimising the risk that he will continue to
mislead, as he has in the past,” and concluded that the case for
erasure was “not made out.”54
While this case was decided under the DPD as implemented into
UK law by the Data Protection Act 1998,55 clear parallels to the
GDPR, Article 17(1)(a) can be seen. One of the primary focuses of
the court, as illustrated by the quotations above, was whether the
data represented the claimant as they were at the time of the erasure
request—or, in other words, whether the information was still
necessary for the purposes of informing a reader about the claimant
and warning the public about their criminal behavior.56 This question
will inescapably involve an on-the-spot evaluation of data protection
rights against the freedom of expression and information; how could
one either evaluate the purpose of the processing or the necessity of
the data for those purposes without involving such questions?
Questions which exist under Article 17(1)(a), then, seem much more
51

Id. ¶¶ 229, 230.
Id. ¶ 223.
53
Id. ¶ 170.
54
Id.
55
Data Protection Act 1998, c.29 (Eng. and Wales).
56
See, inter alia, NT1 v Google LLC, ¶¶ 170, 223, 227.
52

698

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

likely to require a judge to actively engage the freedom of
expression and information under Article 17(3)(a) (or, at least, seem
to be much more likely to be capable of doing so). Further, one can
at this stage wonder whether the exact way this balancing act plays
out could vary from one Member State to another. As will be
explored later, one may be able to imagine situations where the
strengths of the Charter rights involved vary between countries and,
therefore, suggest that Article 17(1)(a) should win in some locations
and Article 17(3)(a) in others.
The final ground for erasure is sub-paragraph (f), where the data
has been collected in connection with the GDPR, Article 8(1).57
Article 8(1) itself is engaged if personal data (a) relates to a child
under the age of sixteen (although Member States may further lower
this age to a minimum of thirteen); (b) was processed on the basis
of consent under Article 6(1)(a); and (c) was processed “in relation
to the offer of information society services directly to a child.”58
Where these conditions apply, Article 8 states that the initial
processing is unlawful unless the consent is “given or authorised by
the holder of parental responsibility over the child.”59
Where personal data relating to a child is processed in such a
context and such consent is not given, the processing would be
unlawful, and the data could be erased under Article 17(1)(d), even
without a dedicated special ground.60 The extra added value of
Article 17(1)(f) is therefore that the data subject (whether or not they
are still a child) still has the right to have information erased where
the processing of the data was legally performed, whether or not
they have formally removed their consent to the processing, and
whether or not the controller may have another legitimate basis for
processing that data.61 There are clear normative arguments in favor
of this; for example, an adult may, in hindsight, realize that they
57

The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 8(1).
Id.
59
Id.
60
It should be remembered that if a data subject removes their consent, they
would normally have a right to have the data erased under art. 17(1)(b) unless the
controller had another justification for retaining that data, whether or not they are
a child.
61
The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17(1)(f).
58
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should not have shared something online, and the law gives greater
leeway for correcting that mistake than it would in other conditions.
Equally, however, this also seems to be a clear situation where a
controller may have a legitimate wish to refuse erasure; the
processing was not, and is not now, illegal, and they may well have
legitimate reasons to continue processing it, including the freedom
of expression and information. Here, then, there is clear scope for
the balancing of rights, particularly based on the exception in Article
17(3)(a).
This question becomes even more difficult as its exact
implementation may vary from Member State to Member State as
Article 8(1) allows Member States to “provide by law for a lower
age for [the application of Article 8(1)] provided that such lower age
is not below 13 years.”62 It may, therefore, be the case that a data
subject between the ages of thirteen and sixteen from one Member
State may be able to invoke erasure under Article 17(1)(f), where a
data subject of the same age from another Member State may not.
There has yet to be decisive case law on whether this rule should be
decided based on the location of the data subject, the location of the
controller, or some variation of the two.
Both of these grounds, then, introduce more ambiguity and, in
particular, begin to provide some leeway for a case-by-case analysis
of the extent to which erasure may affect the freedom to expression
and information. Importantly, and as will be explored later, these
case-by-case analyses may have a geographical consideration, with
the balance tipping one way or another depending on the different
countries involved.
4. Data Protection, Journalistic Truth and Reconciliation Across
Borders: Article 85 and Beyond
Article 8 is not the only provision which provides explicit
grounds for geographical variations. As noted above, Article 85
requires that:
(1) Member States shall by law reconcile the right to the protection of
personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom
of expression and information, including processing for journalistic

62

Id. at art. 8(1).
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purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary
expression.
(2) For processing carried out for journalistic purposes or the purpose
of academic, artistic or literary expression, Member States shall
provide for exemptions or derogations from Chapter II (principles
[which contains Articles 5, 6 and 9], Chapter III (rights of the data
subject) [which contains Article 17] [as well as Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7
and 9] . . . if they are necessary to reconcile the right to the
protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and
information.
(3) Each Member State shall notify to the Commission the provisions
of its law which it has adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 . . .63

This is an extremely interesting provision which provides much
fuel for discussion. In particular, the interaction between Article 85
and Article 17(3)(a) is interesting given the overlapping
subject-matter of the two provisions and, while Article 17(3)(a) may
not automatically seem to create a regional variation for erasure, the
combination with Article 85 raises at least the possibility that the
true case may be otherwise.
As a starting point, the discretion provided in Article 85 feels a
little odd. Being a regulation, the GDPR’s rules are directly binding
on Member States64 and, as Member States are not entitled to
independently interpret EU law,65 individual countries must follow
a central concept of both the right to the protection of personal data,
and the Charter right to the freedom of expression and information.
Particularly important for the purposes of Article 85, this lack of
competence to interpret EU law means that Member States are not
able to independently interpret how much discretion they are given
by the term “reconcile” in Article 85. Nevertheless, Member States
may have their own constitutional conceptions of the freedom of
expression and information, or of concepts of privacy and data
63

Id. at art. 85.
TFEU, supra note 19, at art. 288. This is generally opposed to Directives,
which must be implemented into national law and therefore leave more scope for
national variation, particularly as to the “form and methods” of implementation.
Id.
65
See, e.g., the TFEU, supra note 19, at art. 267; Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L,
1964 ECR 01141; ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; and Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel, 1970 ECR 01125; ECLI:EU:C:1970:114.
64
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protection, which may need to be resolved under the Article 85
procedure.66 Further, as will be discussed in more detail below, EU
law must be drafted in line with a certain number of principles. This
includes the principle of subsidiarity, which states that if the Treaties
do not give the EU exclusive competence in an area, it should only
act if “the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States . . . but can rather, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union
level.”67 Article 85 plays an important role in this regard, allowing
Member States to protect the freedom of expression and information
in a way which complies with this principle.68
Within the discretion granted to Member States by Article 85,
there are two interesting differences between paragraphs (1) and
(2). Of the two, paragraph (1) is more general, but weaker, covering
the entirety of the GDPR and the freedom of expression and
information in general but only requiring a reconciliation of rights.69
By contrast, paragraph (2) is more powerful, but narrower, allowing
Member States to “provide for exemptions or derogations” but only
covering specific parts of the GDPR and only applying for
processing that is performed for specific purposes.70 One would be
forgiven for wondering how a Member State should reconcile the
rights of data protection and the freedom of expression and
information under paragraph (1) if it is not able to suspend or exempt
GDPR rules, particularly given the interpretive restrictions
66
It is perhaps interesting to note in this context that, despite early
conversations on the topic, fundamental rights did not gain any notable legal
protection under EU law until the ECJ was directly confronted by
incompatibilities between EU law and German constitutional rules. See, e.g., Case
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. Fundamental rights in the European
Union can, therefore, be seen in some way as a way of allowing Member States
to protect human rights while maintaining the supremacy of EU law. For an
interesting discussion on the history of fundamental rights in the European Union
see, for example, Gráinne De Búrca, The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law, in
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca eds., 2nd ed.
2011).
67
TFEU, supra note 19, at art. 5(3).
68
The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 85.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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discussed above. Equally, it seems odd that paragraph (2) is so
limited to journalistic, academic, artistic, and literary expressions as
this selection feels somewhat arbitrary. In many ways, one is
therefore left to wonder what the practical effect of each of these
provisions was intended to be, will be, and why the two were
separated in this way.
Regardless of how exactly Member States choose to implement
Article 85, the core message is the same: that the GDPR accepts,
and moreover endorses, that certain provisions must play out
differently in different Member States. This is interesting for
erasure, as Article 17 is included in the provisions which can be
exempted under Article 85(2).71 One can, therefore, easily imagine
a situation where such an order is permitted (or even required) in
one Member State, but not in another. Presumably, this would
require that the erasure be ordered on a geographically limited basis
between Member States. Given that this variation is based on the
fact that different Member States may need to act in different ways
to protect the freedom of expression and information, this must
therefore be taken as more evidence of the GDPR’s acceptance that
geographical considerations will affect the balancing of the
protection of personal data and the freedom of expression and
information.
Having established these different grounds for variations, it is
interesting to quickly look at the law’s claims to harmonization.72 In
particular, it may be very easy to overstate the aims and effects of
the law in this field. In Recital 7, the GDPR does not say that unified
rules must be implemented, rather that there is a need for “a strong
and more coherent data protection framework.”73 Further, Recital 9
criticizes the fragmentation causes “differences in the level of
protection,” not that fragmentation provides differences in the
implementation of that protection per se.74 In theory, therefore,
arguably the harmonizing aims of the GDPR do not necessarily aim
for the same practical rules, or even the same results or conclusions,
71

The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 85(2).
See, e.g., id. at Recitals 3–7.
73
Id. at Recital 7.
74
Id. at Recital 9 (emphasis added).
72
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as so much that it aims for the same frameworks and levels. This
idea would be supported by the discussion above and the idea that
the GDPR recognizes that, inevitably, the rights can only be
properly balanced when geography is considered. Nevertheless, if
this produces different substantive rules or ends up with notably
different results from one Member State to another, it is
questionable how useful a unified framework would be for either
data subjects or controllers. At the very least, the text of the law
seems to suggest that perhaps perceptions of the GDPR as a
monolithic, homogenous set of data protection rules across the
European Union deserve reconsideration.
B. Google LLC v. CNIL: What Actually Happened?
The potential for regional variation in erasure requests discussed
above is not simply hypothetical, or simply based on a reading of
the GDPR. Rather, this very issue was discussed by the ECJ in the
case of Google LLC v. CNIL.75 This Section will examine that case,
its context, and the decision of the ECJ to draw some conclusions
about the way that the Court sees geographical variations in the right
to erasure.
1. Going Courting
Google LLC v. CNIL began life as a decision by the CNIL
ordering that, when Google grants an erasure request, it must delete
the search results from each instance of its website, to take effect
regardless of the country from which the search was made.76 Google
rejected this decision, instead only deleting results from searches
made within the European Union.77 The CNIL subsequently issued
a fine against Google, which in turn sought annulment of the
decision with the French court, the Conseil d’État.78 That court
determined that the decision involved the interpretation of EU law
and therefore made a preliminary reference to the ECJ.79
75
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
76
Google LLC v. CNIL (judgment), ¶ 30.
77
Id. ¶ 31.
78
Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
79
Id. ¶¶ 30–39.
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It may be useful at this stage to make two points about the
preliminary reference procedure.80 First, as was already noted,
national courts have no jurisdiction to interpret points of EU law and
must refer such questions to the ECJ.81 The other side of this is that
the ECJ has no jurisdiction to interpret national law and cannot
decide issues of fact.82 As a result, the ECJ did not make a final
decision in the case, which was returned to the Conseil d’État for
final adjudication.83 Secondly, while the European Union does not
follow a common law system, for the purposes of this Article, the
ECJ’s rulings can be effectively seen as setting precedents84 and,
absent either legislation or the ECJ deciding to answer another
preliminary reference, Google LLC v. CNIL can be seen as
representing the state of the law. However, it is important to note
that there are no rules concerning which parts of the ruling is
actually binding. Further, as was arguably best described by Craig
and de Búrca:
The ECJ’s . . . judgments are collegiate, representing the single ruling of
all judges hearing the case. There are no dissents or separately
concurring judgments, and therefore divergent judicial views may be
contained within the judgment. This can result in a ruling that is
ambiguous on matters of importance . . . Moreover . . . the Court may
80

For more information on the functioning of the ECJ, see, e.g., PAUL CRAIG,
EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Chapter 10, 261–88 (2nd ed. 2012).
81
Id.
82
See Information Note on References from National Courts for a Preliminary
Ruling, 2005 O.J. (C 143) 1, ¶ 5.
83
This was done in Conseil d’État 27 Mars 2020, N 399922. Readers wishing
to avoid spoilers as to how the story ends may wish to skip the rest of this footnote.
For those who remain, the French Court annulled the fine in light of the ECJ’s
decision.
84
The ECJ has previously stated that while answers to preliminary references
are given to the referring court, courts from other Member States can rely on that
decision for the interpretation of EU law. However, national courts must still
make a preliminary reference if they think that the new case is sufficiently
different that a question must be raised again. See, e.g., C-66/80 International
Chemical Corporation v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, 1981 ECR
01191; ECLI:EU:C:1981:102, ¶¶ 13–14. While courts are entitled to bring
preliminary references even where no new ground is covered, the ECJ is likely to
simply refer to the previous decision. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-28–30/62 Da
Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 ECR 00061; ECLI:EU:C:1963:6, ¶¶ 38–39.
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prefer not to commit itself on a specific legal issue until another case
arises where it is directly necessary for a decision.85

Having provided this background, it is now possible to return to
Google LLC v. CNIL. In that case, the French court referred three
questions to the ECJ, asking:
(a) whether a search engine could be ordered to erase (or, in
the language of the question, de-reference) search results
globally;
(b) if not, whether, a search engine granting erasure must
remove the results in all Member States or just the place
where the request was made; and
(c) whether a search engine is obliged to use geoblocking
techniques to prevent users in places where erasure was
made from finding the results via another location’s
version of the search engine.86
In answering these questions, which were “dealt with
together,”87 the ECJ framed its decision “in light of both [the DPD]
and [the GDPR] in order to ensure that its answers will be of use to
the referring court in any event.”88 On the one hand, this improves
the value of the case as precedent as readers can be certain that its
effectiveness shall continue under the new regime. On the other
hand, dealing with such a wide variety of issues and sources at once
does make it harder to derive specific points of utility (especially
where the decision matches the style described by Craig and de
Búrca).89
To begin with the conclusion, the ECJ gave the following
answers to the French court’s questions:
(a) “[C]urrently, there is no obligation under EU law . . . for
a search engine operator to carry out such a de-referencing
on all versions of its search engine” and the GDPR,
85
PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS,
63 (5th ed. 2011).
86
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 39 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
87
Id. ¶ 43.
88
Id. ¶ 41.
89
CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 85.
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Article 17 cannot be read as requiring a controller do to
so.90 However, EU law “does not prohibit such a
practice” if, after balancing the rights of privacy, data
protection, and freedom of expression and information,
such an order is “appropriate”;91
(b) While, “in principle,” erasure is “supposed to” occur in
all Member States, “the interest of the public in accessing
information may, even within the Union, vary from one
Member State to another” such that the balancing of
rights may require different answers in different
countries. Where processing occurs across multiple
Member States, it is for national Data Protection
Authorities to “reach a consensus and a single decision”
as to the extent of the erasure requirements;92 and
(c) Search engines must take “sufficiently effective
measures to ensure the effective protection” of
fundamental rights and it is up to the national court to
determine what measures are required.93
There is a lot to unpack from this judgment and, in many ways,
one could say that it seems to raise more questions than it actually
answers. However, a key takeaway from the passages above is that,
under EU law, the right to erasure can be subject to geographical
limitations, and one of the key factors when determining these
limitations is the balancing of interests between the right to the
protection of personal data and the right to the freedom of expression
and information.94 This conclusion supports some of the conclusions
and themes suggested in Section II.A above, but also inherits some
of the difficulties raised there. Indeed, the idea of location-based
erasure, while sensible in some regards, is conceptually difficult and
inconsistent in others—particularly when that balance is based on a

90
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶¶ 64–65 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
91
Id. ¶ 72.
92
Id. ¶¶ 66–69.
93
Id. ¶ 70–71.
94
Id. ¶¶ 64–72.
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supposedly harmonizing regime and EU-wide concepts of
fundamental rights.
Before beginning a deeper analysis of Google LLC v. CNIL, it is
important to consider the scope of the judgment. The Court in that
case focused on the term “dereferencing” rather than “erasure” and
framed its discussion clearly in terms of search engines.95 This is, in
part, because of the nature of the case; as a preliminary reference,
the ECJ is answering the question put to it, which involved a search
engine and was phrased by the French court in terms of a right to
dereferencing.96 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that
the decision cannot be extended to other types of controllers. First,
the GDPR, Article 17 does not contain any language that would limit
itself in such a way and is rather framed against controllers as a
whole, which means that erasure is enforceable against any
controller.97 Secondly, while conceivably there may be controllers
to whom the considerations discussed in Google LLC v. CNIL may
or should not apply, nothing suggests that search engine operators
are sufficiently unique that the judgment must be narrowed so
particularly.
2. There Is No Right to a Global Erasure (At Least for Now . . . )
The first major point of analysis will be the differences between
its treatment of intra- and extra-EU processing. In reaching its
finding on this point, the ECJ relied on a number of factors. During
its analysis, the Court noted that the purpose of the GDPR was to
“guarantee a high level of protection . . . throughout the [European
Union]”; that global erasure “would meet that objective in full”;98
and that “in a globalised world,” access by users (whether inside or
outside of the European Union) to personal data online was “likely
to have immediate and substantial effects on that person.”99 These
considerations, the Court claimed, would have justified the EU’s
legislature to create a global right to erasure.100
95
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However, the ECJ further noted that not all countries recognized
a right to erasure (and that, if they did, they did not do so in the same
way),101 and the right to data protection must be balanced against
other rights, including the freedom of expression and information—
a balance which was “likely to vary significantly around the
world.”102 The ECJ placed a heavy emphasis on the actual wording
of Article 17, stating that it was “in no way apparent” that the Article
was intended to create a global scope of application.103 The Court
further stated that Article 17(3)(a) showed that the EU legislature
had “struck a balance between [the right of data protection] and the
[freedom of expression and information] so far as the Union is
concerned . . . [but] it has not, to date, struck such a balance as
regards the scope of [erasure] outside the Union.”104
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that Article 17 did
not create a global obligation for erasure.105 This decision is
interesting for a number of reasons. Notably, the ECJ did not discuss
the impact of Article 3 of the GDPR (which governs the territorial
scope of the GDPR).106 This omission seems slightly odd as, prima
facie, Article 3(2)—which states that certain processing activities
outside of the EU still fall within the scope of the GDPR—would
seem to be a controlling provision. Nevertheless, from a practical
and political position, one can understand why the ECJ would be
less than willing to demand a global erasure that would be difficult,
if not impossible, to enforce.
Equally interesting is that the Advocate General107 also
somewhat sidestepped the issue represented by the GDPR, Article 3.
101

Id. ¶ 59.
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103
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The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 3.
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Advocates General are members of the ECJ which provide an impartial
Opinion to the Court. TFEU, supra note 19, at art. 252. The Opinion is given by
one of the Advocates General as part of the oral submissions for a case, although
the ECJ can skip this if the case does not raise a novel point of law. TFEU, supra
note 19, at Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, art. 20. Importantly, despite the Advocate General being a member of the
ECJ and while their Opinions can often be described as persuasive, there is no law
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In his Opinion, A.G. Szpunar first stated that while the French
court’s questions asked about both the interpretation of the GDPR
and the DPD, “there can be no doubt” that the DPD was the
controlling law of the case and therefore the ECJ was not required
to interpret the terms of the GDPR.108 He then analyzed the
applicability of the law, not on its provisions, but on the general
principles of extraterritoriality and found that EU law could not
apply outside of its borders unless exceptional circumstances
applied, none of which applied here.109 Having reached this
conclusion, A.G. Szpunar considered whether the fact that data
protection was a fundamental right could change this result. He
observed that as “the scope of the Charter follows the scope of EU
law and not vice versa”110 and that, if worldwide erasure were
permitted, it would become impossible to balance the right of data
protection with the freedom of information and expression because
the latter “will necessarily vary, depending on its geographic
location, from one third State to another.”111 He further argued that,
if the European Union were to impose a global erasure right, this
may encourage third countries to create their own erasure laws,
which could cause “a genuine risk of a race to the bottom, to the
detriment of freedom of expression.”112
A key element in both the Court’s judgment and the Advocate
General’s Opinion is that, while both went through different
mechanisms to get there, both focused on the balancing of rights and
relied on the idea that geographical location could alter the
importance of certain information or data. However, interestingly,
both the ECJ and the Advocate General seemed to take this
conclusion for granted—or, at least, did not go into detail explaining
why this may be the case.
to say that the ECJ is bound to follow the Opinion, either in structure or substance
(as seen occurring in this case).
108
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:15, ¶ 32 (Jan. 10, 2019) (op. of advoc.
gen.).
109
Id. ¶¶ 47–53.
110
Id. ¶ 55.
111
Id. ¶ 60.
112
Id. ¶ 61.

710

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

Certainly, it is possible to imagine some situations where
information may be more important in one area than in another. For
example, information that changes whether voters want to elect a
particular candidate in the Dawlish Town Council election may be
important for the 11,662 people eligible to vote in that area.113
However, for the 446 million inhabitants of the European Union,114
or 7.8 billion people in the world,115 that information would
undoubtedly have little, if any, importance or relevance.
Nevertheless, one should be careful treating the issue as such an
open and shut question. Once the discussion leaves behind questions
involving the voting booth, things quickly get much more
complicated, and the answers to the questions quickly become much
more subjective. Why, for example, is news about a certain celebrity
more important in one region than another? How popular does a
businessperson’s products have to be before their scandal becomes
relevant to a particular region? What geographical lines can be
drawn around the relative importance of crime? Even within
politics, it is very hard to provide arguments for why speech may be
more important in one area than another; while only American
citizens can vote for the President of the United States, information
about U.S. elections and the behavior of candidates can be important
and influential news throughout the world.
In a way, the questions raised here are slightly unfair as they are,
by and large, unanswerable (at least to any satisfactory legal
standard). Further, the issues raised by these questions actually
support the ECJ’s conclusion—given the difficulty in balancing the
protection of personal data and the freedom of expression and
information, particularly in a global context, it would be wrong to
claim that the GDPR, Article 17 was an appropriate tool to regulate
the issue. Nevertheless, it would have been preferable for the Court
to engage a little more openly with the issue, rather than simply
relying on the vague and unsupported assumption of self-evidence.

113
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This greater engagement would also have helped with the fact
that, confusingly, neither the Advocate General nor the ECJ finished
with a simple dismissal of global erasure. Almost as an afterthought
(in a single paragraph at the end of its judgment, which tellingly
begins “Lastly,”), the ECJ added that while EU law did not
“currently require” global erasure, it also did not “prohibit” it where
the balancing of rights required such an order.116 For his part, A.G.
Szpunar added a final paragraph to his analysis stating that he did
“not exclude the possibility that there may be situations” where EU
law could require worldwide erasure.117
These comments leave a number of unanswered questions at the
end of the judgment. While the Advocate General was clear that the
DPD could not support a global erasure order, and that new EU
legislation would be required for such an order to be possible, he did
not comment on whether the GDPR had imposed such a rule.118 This
is particularly notable given that the GDPR contains new rules on
territorial applicability under Article 3, which were not
substantively addressed by either the Opinion or the Court’s
judgment. Meanwhile, the ECJ seemed to leave it open to “a
supervisory or judicial authority of a Member State” to decide that
a global order would be appropriate “in light of national standards
of protection of fundamental rights.”119 While this may seem like a
convenient loophole, the ECJ also found that Article 17 did not
create such a power and, as the ECJ is the only body capable of
interpreting the GDPR and Member States are therefore very limited
in their powers to legislate around that law,120 one may wonder under
what legal basis such an order could actually be made. In many
ways, this paragraph may seem to imply that the ECJ has simply
116

Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 72 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
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Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
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See The TFEU, supra note 19, at art. 267; Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L, 1964
ECR 01141; ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; and Case 11/70, Internationale
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Futtermittel, 1970 ECR 01125; ECLI:EU:C:1970:114.

712

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

reserved the right to change its mind in the future; for now, Article
17 does not impose a global erasure regime, but it may do so in the
future.
3. EU-Based Erasure: A Little Respect
The next element of the decision for consideration is the ECJ’s
finding that an erasure order does not necessarily have to cover the
entirety of the European Union, provided that the erasure occurs in
the geographical locations necessary to ensure the protection of the
data subjects’ rights.121
The Court did not give this issue as much consideration as the
idea of global erasure, although it implicitly relied on very similar
logic. As before, the ECJ began by noting that global erasure was
“in principle” necessary to meet the GDPR’s goals,122 but that the
interests in accessing information may be different in different
Member States, and that this may change the balancing of rights, “in
particular” where processing relates solely to journalistic purposes,
or artistic or literary expression, and so fall under Article 85(2).123
The solution provided by the Court was that this question be dealt
with by national Data Protection Authorities (being the national
bodies empowered by the GDPR, Chapter VI to deal with issues of
data protection compliance and enforcement), which can use the
various cooperation and consistency mechanisms to “provide each
other with relevant information and mutual assistance” and “reach a
consensus and a single decision.”124 It is, the Court concluded, up to
these Authorities to decide whether an EU-wide erasure order was
necessary, or (implicitly) whether the data subject’s rights could be
appropriately protected and balanced against the freedom of
expression and information with a more restricted order.125
This discussion mirrors a lot of the above debate as to global
erasure. However, there is one important difference—unlike global
erasure, where there are live questions as to the applicability and
enforceability of the GDPR, erasure requests in the European Union
121
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are firmly grounded in and enforced under that law. It is, therefore,
important to resist the urge to get lost in general and abstract
discussions about the balancing of rights and stay firmly focused
within Article 17 itself. As discussed above, questions of local
discretion are likely to focus around Article 17(1)(a), (e) and (f), or
where Article 17 has been suspended in some way under the Article
85(2) procedure (and, even then, questions involving Articles
17(1)(e) and 85(2) will focus on discretion with the local
legislature).
In terms of compliance and enforcement, it is at least
conceptually easier to deal with geographical variations under
Articles 17(1)(e) and 85. This is because these variations must be
set out as established legal rules (e.g., statute), rather than being
decided on a case-by-case basis. While there is room to argue about
whether or not the particular geographical boundaries are
appropriate or justified, they will at least be clear, as they are limited
to the jurisdiction of the relevant laws. It is also likely that cases
involving journalistic, literary, or artistic expressions may feature
some of the more important (or, at least, dramatic and high-profile)
balancing issues. Certainly, such cases seemed to draw a focus in
the ECJ’s analysis, although notably, in the decision of Google
Spain, the ECJ focused on Google’s economic interests in
displaying search results, rather than its journalistic role.126 In
addition to this, it must be remembered that Article 85 only applies
where decisions are “solely” for the specified purposes, which is a
significant narrowing of the exception.127
Such cases, then, are comparatively easy; the geographical
limitations will largely be set out by law and the question will (in
ideal cases) be resolved by a comparison of the various statute
books. By contrast, cases where erasure is requested because the
data is no longer necessary under Article 17(1)(a) or because the
information relates to a child and was processed in the context of an
information society service on the basis of consent under
126
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Article 17(1)(e) contain open questions about the amount of scope
that actually exists for regional variations.
To first examine a situation of necessity, the following
hypothetical is useful. For example, one can imagine a system
created to provide a list of individuals who offer certain services.
This list is not created for advertising purposes, but as a form of
expression, e.g., because the list operator’s political beliefs mean
that they wish to praise or to condemn actors in a certain field. A
service provider who had previously acted in three countries and
who is included in the list ceases to act altogether in country A,
ceases to offer the specific service but remains active in the field
generally in country B, and continues to offer the original service in
country C. The processing of the information in question, being the
inclusion of the service prover on the list, is no longer necessary for
the original purpose in countries A and B, but is still necessary in
country C. Prima facie, then, there would be a case for erasure under
Article 17(1)(a), at least insofar as relates to countries A and B. The
operator may, however, argue that their freedom of expression and
information allows them to keep the information available in
country A because of the data subject’s historic involvement with
the service and in country B because of their continued, related
activities.
In this example, it is argued that the relevant interests (and the
relevant weight of each interest) clearly vary between each country.
As a result, the implementation of the balancing act must also be
different in each of the three locations, although it is very difficult
to say at this level of detail whether it would be different enough to
produce different erasure-request results. Regardless of the specific
end-result, the fact that situations such as this raise the question
means that there is reasonable scope for Member State-specific
erasure orders to exist, and it seems reasonable to ask supervisory
authorities (using their local knowledge and the cooperation
procedures laid out under the GDPR) to address these questions at
an enforcement level. However, it must also be emphasized that
localized orders would only be a realistic option if they can be
reliably enforced—an issue to which this Article will return.
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If this possibility is accepted, the ECJ’s conclusion therefore
seems reasonable, although cases which fit into these scenarios are
likely to involve significant room for debate as to what should be
the correct outcome. Further, while the facts would clearly be
different, it is argued that the same result is at least conceptually
possible in cases involving Article 17(1)(e).
Interestingly, however, the Advocate General reached the
opposite conclusion to the ECJ on the issue of EU-wide erasure
orders.128 Unlike under the first question, A.G. Szpunar did answer
this question by reference to the GDPR, stating that, as a regulation,
it “transcends the internal-market approach of [the DPD] . . . to
ensure a complete system of personal data protection” and therefore
the only answer was that erasure “must be carried out not at a
national level . . . but at EU level.”129 This approach would certainly
be easier from a compliance point of view, and would certainly help
to ensure a strong and consistent protection for personal data rights.
However, with respect to the Advocate General, and recognizing
that the GDPR is equally applicable in all Member States, the
Authors prefer the conclusion reached by the ECJ. In particular, the
reasoning given does not seem to have fully considered: that data
protection is a qualified (not an absolute) right, the varying
importance of the freedom of expression and information from one
Member State to another, or the fact that Articles 17(3)(a) and 85(2)
permit national variation within the unified GDPR regime.
4. Geoblocking and Other Technological Solutions
The final question addressed by the decision was whether
geoblocking, or other equivalent tools, should be used as part of an
erasure order.130 Both the ECJ and the Advocate General dealt very
quickly with this question, and neither provided any significant
discussion or analysis. The Court simply stated that where an order
is made, the controller must “take, if necessary, sufficiently effective
128
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:15, ¶¶ 75–77 (Jan. 10, 2019) (op. of advoc.
gen.).
129
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130
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des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶¶ 70–71 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
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measures” to “meet all the legal requirements and have the effect of
preventing or, at the very least, seriously discouraging internet
users,” and that these measures could be reviewed by national
courts.131 Equally concisely, the Advocate General stated that if an
erasure order is made, controllers must take “all the steps which are
technically possible” to comply effectively, including
geoblocking.132
Once one accepts that an erasure order deserves to be made, and
if one also accepts that an erasure order does not have to be made
globally, the use of geoblocking and other technical tools seems
inescapable. An order which could be easily circumvented by
simply navigating to a different top-level domain (e.g., swapping
from .eu to .com, or from .fr to .fi) would be no true protection at
all. Equally, if a controller is ordered to erase the personal data from
search results (or equivalent) in a certain jurisdiction, they can
hardly be said to have complied with that order if they do not
actually take steps to stop that information from being accessible in
that region; leaving aside the spirit of the order, it cannot be said to
be complying with the letter of such an order if one simply removes
the information from the “targeted” version of a website.
However, there are two issues which should be raised at this
point. The first is whether the concept of geoblocking changes the
normative evaluation of the right to erasure as a whole. Any concept
of geoblocking will inevitably give rise to questions about a
fragmented internet, the idea that the so-called “world wide web” is
no longer such because a person’s level of access depends on where
they live.133 This fragmentation is both a conscious and deliberate
consequence of the ECJ’s judgment, and it must be for the reader to
decide whether they consider this a positive or a negative.
Ultimately, however, it would seem impossible to properly respect
any variations in the balancing of rights without such fragmentation,
131

Id.
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
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and, if one decides that it is something to be avoided, one must also
decide which of the competing rights must be the one to suffer.
Secondly, the actual efficiency of geoblocking and other
technological measures cannot be guaranteed. While they will
undoubtedly dissuade some users from accessing information,
others may be able to circumvent such limitations. For example, to
avoid geoblocking based on the user’s IP address, a user could
connect through a virtual private network (“VPN”), making it
appear as though they are connecting from a different address
(specifically one registered to a location that is not blocked).134 Such
a service would allow somebody to appear as though they are
connecting from a location in which the data has not been erased,
and therefore access the data notwithstanding that it would
otherwise be unavailable in their country. It is worth further noting,
however, that such services should not be considered a silver bullet
to geoblocking techniques; there are other methods of detecting a
user’s location which may betray the truth notwithstanding
measures taken.135 Further, some websites may simply refuse service
if they think that the user is attempting to use a service to conceal
their real location.136
The ECJ did not seem to engage with these issues, rather leaving
it for the Data Protection Authorities to determine what was
appropriate or necessary in any particular case. This aspect of the
judgment can be criticized, since arguably the question of
geoblocking is core to the question of geographical limitations and
variations with erasure, at least from a practical perspective.
Ultimately, however, this issue seems to be somewhat irrelevant
from a theoretical perspective; if the law admits, or even requires,
134
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geographical variations, as the right to erasure has been shown to
do, it must also require some kind of enforcement or else render
those measures pointless. Further, if one believes that such measures
are necessary, this may be an area where the perfect becomes an
enemy of the good, since there is unlikely to be any sudden
development or change allowing for a fool-proof and complete
geoblocking system.
C. Equal Protection, Different Results?
The above Sections have analyzed both the text of the GDPR
and the case of Google LLC v. CNIL and found numerous areas
where the right of erasure, as balanced against the freedom of
expression and information, requires geographical variations, both
inside and outside of the European Union. This creates a strange
system where, although the rights gain the same protection in each
country, that protection may play out to provide different results in
different locations.
Importantly, this is not necessarily seen as a criticism of the
GDPR. Although the law intended to provide a single regime to
cover the entire European Union, it would be both artificial and
awkward if this meant that the same result must always be applied
in every instance. This consequence arises both as a result of
common sense, and EU legal principles, such as subsidiarity and
proportionality. Further, these variations have been seen to play an
important political and practical role.
The wisdom of these seemingly fractured approaches, built into
the GDPR and highlighted by the Google LLC v. CNIL case, can
inform the ongoing debate in the United States about how to
structure privacy law in a federal system. The next Section explores
how the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that explicitly
shape the EU system might caution against preemptive federal
privacy law.
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III. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM GOOGLE LLC V.
CNIL: SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
A. The GDPR Example: Not So Monolithic and Not So Hostile to
Competing Interests
The Google LLC v. CNIL decision reveals that the EU data
protection model is less centralized and less burdensome on
competing interests than commonly thought. This reality should
inform the debate in the United States about broad preemptive
privacy law.137 The GDPR example and the underlying principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality argue for caution regarding
solutions that would limit states or impose a singular approach for
balancing privacy with freedoms of speech and of the press and the
related interest in access to information.
In the United States, advocates for stronger privacy throughout
the country support a federal floor of protection perhaps with less
sectoral variation to provide a less confusing set of expectations for
individuals.138 Privacy advocates have expressed doubt that federal
efforts will produce protection that is strong enough to warrant
trading away innovative law that is being passed in some states.139
Those who seek to collect and use personal information also support
federal privacy legislation but generally for different reasons. Data
137

While the specific issues of territoriality of the erasure law can inform the
comparatively small pockets of erasure law in the United States or even internet
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users seek legislation that would create trust and induce sharing of
personal information to support its use, that would reduce what is
seen as unfair inconsistencies across sectors and media, and that
would simplify and reduce costs of compliance across jurisdictions.
Preemption is an important goal for most data users.140
The GDPR is a touchstone for this debate. Although the EU form
of privacy harmonization has been explained and promoted, the true
extent of deference and balancing in the GDPR remains largely
underappreciated in the United States.141 In the United States, the 99
Articles and 173 preamble recitals of the GDPR have been viewed
as broad and strong support for individuals’ rights to data protection.
The GDPR has been described as “sweeping,”142 “strict,”143 and as a
“framework that harmonizes data protection rules across the
European Union.”144 Certainly, the GDPR is broader than any one or
even the sum of the sectoral sorts of federal privacy laws of the
United States.145 And, the overall impact of the GDPR is widely

140
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viewed as providing individuals with more control over information
about themselves.146 The European Union itself has determined that
the flow of personal data from the European Union to the United
States must be carefully conditioned because U.S. law is deemed not
“adequate” to meet strong EU standards.147 As the United States
debates new national privacy legislation, some describe the
proposals as strong omnibus legislation in the style of the GDPR.148
As Section II of this Article showed, the Google LLC v. CNIL
decision highlights decentralizing aspects of the GDPR. These
aspects of the regulation are counter to common impressions of the
EU regulation.149 This Section examines the concepts of subsidiarity
and proportionality that are evident in law that forms the backdrop
for the ECJ’s limitations on erasure territoriality in the Google LLC
v. CNIL judgment. Explicit considerations of subsidiarity and
proportionality do not feature prominently in the legal lexicon of the
United States.150 The EU example suggests that some attention to
privacy statutes do not cover all personal data, but only data in particular sectors,
or held by particular entities.”).
146
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van de Sloot & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius,
The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What
It Means, 28 INFO. & COMMC’NS TECH. L. 65, 88 (“Europeans enjoy unparalleled
data subject rights; they can access, rectify, and erase personal data, and have the
right to object to, or restrict, processing.”).
147
The GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 45. Two arrangements that supported the
transfer of EU persons’ data to the United States have been invalidated as not
sufficient for EU data protection standards. See Case C-362/14 Maximillian
Schrems v Data Prot. Comm’r., ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, passim (Oct. 6, 2015);
Case C-311/18 Data Prot. Comm’r v Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximilian Schrems
and intervening parties, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, passim (Dec. 19, 2019).
148
See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 771 (2019) (outlining reasons why the EU omnibus model has influenced
privacy law trends around the world).
149
See Oskar J. Gstrein, Right to be Forgotten: European Data Imperialism,
National Privilege, or Universal Human Right? 13 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 125,
151–52 (2020) (noting “[a]t first this [case] seems surprising, . . . [h]owever . . .
the substantive development of delisting has become a multi-layer and
multi-stakeholder exercise with some space for diversity, also within Europe”).
150
See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED 148–250, (2016)
(comparing the European and U.S. approaches to balancing competing rights,
describing the process as pre-application of the right in the United States and
post-application in Europe).

722

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

both principles may be useful as the United States considers new
federal privacy legislation.
B. Subsidiarity as a Guiding Principle in EU Law and Evident in
Google LLC v. CNIL
Subsidiarity is a principle explicitly incorporated into the law
that shapes the European Union. Controlling language states that
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, either at central or at regional and local level, but can
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.151

Scholars debate subsidiarity’s meaning, its purpose, factors for
application, and its utility.152 Nonetheless, this squishy principle is
evident in many parts of the GDPR, including Article 17 provisions
for the right to erasure, and the Google LLC v. CNIL decision is
consistent with these limitations on centralization.
The goals of a centralized and strong data protection law are
reflected in the regulation form of the law, in the language of the
recitals, and in some provisions of the GDPR. Stakeholders involved
in the passage of the EU law touted the new law’s uniformity.153 But,
151

TEU, supra note 20, at art. 5(3).
See generally, e.g., David Lazer & Vikto Mayer-Schoenberger, Blueprints
for Change: Devolution and Subsidiarity in the United States and the European
Union, in FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 118–43 (Kalypso Nicolaidis and
Robert Howse eds., 2003) (ebook) (reviewing policy and law in the EU and the
United States addressing proper allocation of authority between central governing
bodies and component states, and finding as of 2001, more procedural criteria
than substantive restrictions on central authority); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity
as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
38 (2003) (exploring the history and purpose of subsidiarity); Andreas Føllesdal,
Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity in. NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND
SUBSIDIARITY (2014) (assessing the effectiveness of different implementations of
subsidiarity); Andreas Follesdal, Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity (2013)
(Univ. of Oslo Fac. of L., PluriCourts Rsch. Paper No. 2013-35) https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2359964
[https://perma.cc/S6CK-DA6Y]
(“[C]onsiderations
of
subsidiarity will seldom resolve disagreements about the allocation of authority.”).
153
Vivian Reading, Foreword to MONIKA KUSCHEWSKY, DATA PROTECTION &
PRIVACY: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS, at viii (2012) (writing as Vice152
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several components of the law including the Recitals, Provisions for
harmonization of Member States’ implementations, Article 85, and
the erasure provision itself include nontrivial acknowledgement of
the retention of Member States’ own authority to enact and apply
the law in potentially varying ways. The ECJ considered some of
these dueling forces in its opinion limiting the automatic pan-EU
application of search engine erasure actions.
Perhaps tellingly, the ECJ did not identify the regulation form of
the GDPR as a factor in its analysis of whether EU law required a
pan-EU territorial scope for erasure in search engine de-listing
cases. Generally, the regulation form of the EU law gives more
authority to the European Union than a directive.154 Regulations
constitute directly applicable law, while directives provide a
framework that Member States are expected to use as guides for
enacting national implementing law.155 Statements of officials156 and

President and Member of the European Commission responsible for Justice,
Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship: “[g]lobalization, economic integration and
technical progress are international processes by default. As a result, businesses
my increasingly find themselves in violation of laws in some countries . . . .data
protection reform . . . will simplify and harmonise legal requirements in the EU,
and provide a level playing field for businesses.”).
154
VAN DER SLOOT, supra note 12, at 17. But see Julian Wagner & Alexander
Benecke, National Legislation with the Framework of the GDPR, 2 EUR. DATA
PROT. L. REV. 353, 359–60 (2016) (exploring the potential for and legality of
complexity due to national laws permitted under the GDPR); Simon Davies, The
Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism over Principle? 2 EUR.
DATA PROT. L. REV. 290, 294–95 (2016) (“The Regulation was originally
intended to obviate the need for implementing legislation at the national level, and
would thus create a harmonized framework.”).
155
TFEU, supra note 19, at art. 288.
156
Giovanni Buttarelli, European Data Protection Supervisor, praised the
Regulation and noted it centralizes accountability and “promises a wider scope
for cooperation . . . both within the EU and internationally.” The EU GDPR as a
Clarion Call for a New Global Digital Gold Standard, 6 INT’L. DATA PRIV. L. 77
(2016) (noting the Regulation); Duncan Robinson, Companies Attach Imbalance
in Data Protection Rules, FIN. TIMES (DEC. 16, 2015), https://www.ft.com/
content/781c9bc4-a402-11e5-873f-68411a84f346 [https://perma.cc/GB5S-SNEU]
(quoting Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament who helped
draft the GDPR: “[t]he new rules will give businesses legal certainty by creating
one common data protection standard across Europe.”).
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analysis by stakeholders157 throughout the legislative process
promoted the uniformity that would be achieved with the new type
of law. One reason the ECJ neglected this point may be that the
Court was looking to both the prior law, the DPD, and to the newer
GDPR due to the progress of the case spanning the replacement of
the Directive with the Regulation.158 But, as was explored in Section
II above, another reason that the ECJ may have neglected the central
authority of the Regulation is that the GDPR contains many relevant
preamble sections as well as provisions that enable and even require
a more decentralized approach to balancing data protection with
competing interests such as expression and access to information,
especially in the context of erasure rights and exceptions to erasure
rights.
The Google LLC v. CNIL decision identifies as relevant to its
deliberations several GDPR recitals that articulate goals for
uniformity of data protection throughout the European Union and
explain the purposes of uniformity.159 The ECJ noted Recital 9,
which states that the Directive’s objectives and principles:
157
Arthur Piper, Data Protection Across the Pond: The Implications of the
EU’s New Data Privacy Law, 63 RISK MANAGEMENT 32, 34 (Jan. 1, 2016) (“Even
if businesses don’t relish the prospect of stricter requirements, there are still things
to like about the incoming regime. For one thing, Europe will have a unified set
of rules governing the use of data that applies in exactly the same way in each of
its member countries.”); Robinson, supra note 156 (quoting a spokesperson for
Facebook: “Having a single set of rules to protect Europeans’ personal data while
creating opportunities for growth and innovation is important for people in Europe
and the European economy”). But see Data Protection Agreement to Bring Major
Changes to EU Privacy Law, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://cdt.org/press/data-protection-agreement-to-bring-major-changes-to-euprivacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/WWU9-ZGYL] (“The goal of the data regulation
reform was to replace the existing patchwork of national laws with one common
regulation . . . An important question is whether this Regulation will be
implemented in a uniform way across the EU.”).
158
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 41 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
159
It is worth emphasizing at this stage that recitals form part of the preamble
for EU legislation and so are not legally binding, rather acting as interpretive
guidelines for the actual Articles which make up the binding law. European
Union, Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission for Persons Involved in the Drafting of European Union Legislation
(2015), Guidelines 7 and 10, at 24, 31–36.
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[R]emain sound, but it has not prevented fragmentation in the
implementation of data protection across the Union, legal uncertainty or
a widespread public perception that there are significant risks to the
protection of natural persons, in particular with regard to online
activity.160

The different levels of protection in Member States are said to
impede the free flow of information throughout the European Union
and “constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of economic activities at
the level of the Union, distort competition and impede authorities in
the discharge of their responsibilities under Union law.”161 These
preamble statements support the popular notion of the EU law as
omnibus and uniform.
The ECJ also refers to the consistency and high level of data
protection goals articulated in Recital 10 before reaching a
conclusion that interests in competing rights may vary from one
Member State to another.162 Recital 10 reflects the consistency goals
of the GDPR but also the difficulties of fully achieving
consistency.163 Recital 10 states:
In order to ensure a consistent and high level of protection of natural
persons and to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data within the
Union, the level of protection of the rights and freedoms of natural
persons with regard to the processing of such data should be equivalent
in all Member States. Consistent and homogenous application of the
rules for the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data should be ensured
throughout the Union.164

Nonetheless, Recital 10 continues by outlining ways that
Member States “should be allowed to maintain or introduce national
provisions to further specify the application of the rules of this
Regulation.”165 Processing for compliance with a legal obligation,
presumably including under Member State law, is noted as an area
160

The GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 9; Google LLC v. CNIL (judgment),

¶ 13.
161

The GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 9.
Google LLC v. CNIL (judgment), ¶ 67.
163
The GDPR, supra note 2, at Recitals 10 and 13. See also The GDPR, supra
note 2, at 119, 129 (“In order to ensure consistent monitoring and enforcement of
this Regulation throughout the Union.”).
164
Id. at Recital 10.
165
Id.
162
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where Member States maintain authority.166 Processing for the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the data controller are also
noted as areas for national authority.167 Member States are further
given “a margin of manoeuvre” to specify their own rules including
those applying to data categorized as sensitive.168 The recital
concludes with “[t]o that extent, this Regulation does not exclude
Member State law that sets out the circumstances for specific
processing situations, including determining more precisely the
conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful.”169
These carve-outs allow for significant Member State variations in
the shape of data protection law.
The ECJ also notes several articles of the text of the GDPR that
outline processes for Member States’ Data Protection Authorities to
cooperate, provide mutual assistance, and conduct joint
operations.170 While the DPD contained some provisions which
required collaboration and cooperation between national Data
Protection Authorities,171 consistency in implementation and
enforcement was nonetheless widely criticized.172 So, provisions in
166
See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of
legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC,
19.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
The GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 10. Other Recitals note areas in which
the EU Regulation would not apply due to broader limits on the scope of EU law
in the context of national security or the separate authority of other EU law to
address crime or the deference to Member States for addressing processing of data
of deceased persons. The GDPR, supra note 2, at Recitals 16, 19, 27.
170
Case C-507/17 Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 ¶¶ 68–69 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment)
(referring to articles 56, 60, 61, 63–66).
171
The DPD, supra note 29, at art. 28(6).
172
See generally Douwe Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection
Directive, Annex 3 (2002) (conducting an extensive comparative study of national
laws implementing the Data Protection Direction and noting throughout
variations in Member States’ approaches); Douwe Korff, Comparative Study on
Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of
Technological Developments (Eur. Comm’n, Working Paper No. 2, 2010)
(highlighting different approaches to evolving privacy risks within the European
Union and noting significant non-harmonization). It is also worth noting that the
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the newer GDPR provide more formal requirements outlining scope
of authority for individual Member States’ data protection
supervisory authorities as well as robust procedures to support
requirements reconciling the variations.173 Interestingly, though, as
explained in Section II, the ECJ found these provisions for
consistency did not provide a general cue that erasure for internet
personal name searches should as a rule result in exactly the same
result simply being copy-pasted throughout the European Union.174
Instead, the Court concluded that these GDPR procedural
harmonization provisions provide an avenue for consideration of
how erasure rights of a resident of one nation might be balanced
differently or even consistently throughout the European Union.175
The reality is that the GDPR text itself seems to retain elements
of a directive with specific delegations of responsibilities to Member
States to enact enabling laws.176 The Article 17 right to erasure’s
exception for balancing data protection with competing rights of
expression and information exist alongside Article 85, which
reflects significant reliance on Member States in requiring each to
enact laws to balance these freedoms and provide regular reports to
the European Union on how these national laws achieve a proper
balancing. Other delegations of responsibilities to Member States
appear in the GDPR, some allowing for “more specific provisions”

European Commission noted that this issue still remains to some extent under the
GDPR and that they consider this to be a goal for the ongoing implementation of
the GDPR. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Data Protection as a pillar of citizens’
empowerment and the European Union’s approach to the digital transition – two
years of application of the General Data Protection Regulation {SWD(2020) 115
final}, COM(2020) 264 final, 5–6.
173
Google LLC v. CNIL (judgment), ¶ 68.
174
See supra Section II.
175
Google LLC v. CNIL (judgment), ¶ 69.
176
Simon Davies, The Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism
over Principle, 2 EUR. DAT. PROT. L. REV. 290, 294–95 (2016) (“The Regulation
was originally intended to obviate the need for implementing legislation at the
national level, and would thus create a harmonised framework. This aim has failed
substantially.”).

728

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 681

and some allowances when they are “necessary and
proportionate.”177
In general, the GDPR reveals substantial elements of
subsidiarity in the authority afforded to, or competency retained by,
Member States. These responsibilities allow for differentiation, but
it remains to be seen just how EU Member States will distinguish
themselves or follow similar paths in enacting national legislation
under Article 85 or in interpreting such provisions as Article 17’s
right to erasure. After more time with the GDPR in place, analysis
of the efficacy of these harmonization processes may tell more about
how much harmonization this procedural framework produces.
Similarly, comparisons of Article 85 reports and legislation may
provide interesting insights into the level of variation across the
European Union in balancing data protection with expression and
information.
Subsidiarity in the United States is arguably integral to the
formal allocations of authority of the federal government and the
states both in the Constitution and in federal courts’ interpretations
of those Constitutional provisions.178 Even if U.S. Constitutional
constraints on federal authority do not prevent preemptive and broad
federal privacy law, subsidiarity should inform the political debate

177

Article 6(2) and Article 6(3) allow Member States to provide greater clarity
to what is meant by lawfulness of processing. The GDPR, supra note 2, at arts.
6(2), 6(3), 23. Article 23 provides room for Member State legislation to restrict
the scope of several articulated obligations and rights under the GDPR “when
such a restriction respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and
is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard
. . . .” Id.
178
See Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States:
Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 369, 371
(2010) (comparing subsidiarity in the United States and the European Union and
asserting the principle has a “largely latent but potentially important role in the
United States.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Lucy D. Bickford, Federalism and
Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law, in FEDERALISM &
SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV 123 (J. E. Fleming & J. T. Levy eds., 2014) (exploring
subsidiarity in the context of U.S. constitutional federalism and arguing that U.S.
subsidiarity should be enforce through judicial review).
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about the appropriateness of a truly omnibus and preemptive federal
law.179
The EU model suggests that creation of a new preemptive U.S.
federal law might not be better just because the law itself purports
to offer uniform protections to individuals and to simplify
compliance. The impact of a broadly applicable law could be
unequal based on the factual and cultural differences that shape life
in different parts of the United States.180 Shared experiences of
history and culture can produce differing levels of commitment to
access to information and to the expressive rights of sharing
information, particularly in comparison with commitment to privacy
or data protection.181 And some data users, like Google and amicus
companies, like Microsoft who supported the Google position,
might argue against the simplicity of a uniform compliance
approach, if they are able to advance their business goals more in
some jurisdictions than they would under a single federal law.182
179

Mills, supra note 178, at 431 (noting that subsidiarity is viewed as “playing
only a very limited role in the U.S. federal system, and then only as a political
rather than a legal principle”).
180
Beate Rössler in her book, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 13 (2005), notes that
there is very little treatment of cultural variations in privacy among Western
democracies, though anthropology and ethnology studies compare Western and
non-Western privacy cultures. See Alison Cool, Impossible, Unknowable,
Accountable: Dramas and dilemmas of data law, 49 SOC. STUD. SCI. 503, 504
(2019) (“The Second World War has cast a long shadow on data practices in
Europe. In France and Germany in particular, centralized national data collection
and interlinkage through personal identification numbers are still viewed as
problematic and suspicious . . . . In the Nordic countries, however, a strong
historical relationship between the social welfare state, national population
registries and data-driven policy has provided another lens through which
extensive and centralized data collection appears if not beneficial, then at least not
inherently negative.”).
181
See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen & Ulla-Maija Mylly, Trade Secrets and the
Right to Information: A Comparative Analysis of E.U. and U.S. Approaches to
Freedom of Expression and Whistleblowing, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2020).
182
Jean Gonié, Foreword to MONIKA KUSCHEWSKY, DATA PROTECTION &
PRIVACY: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS at xiii (2012) (writing as Director of
Privacy, EU Affairs, for Microsoft: “[t]rying to understand the way the current
patchwork of national and regional law around the world applies is, of course, a
priority for the legal ecosystem. But not every size of company can do so easily
because they lack resources.”).
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C. Proportionality, Working in Concert with Subsidiarity in
Google LLC v. CNIL
Like subsidiarity, proportionality is a foundational concept in
documents that shape the European Union.183 Protocol (No. 2) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TEU”) requires
that any draft legislation “should contain a detailed statement
making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.”184 Draft acts are required to
minimize the burden of the legislation on organizations and
individuals and be “commensurate with the objective to be
achieved.”185 Proportionality can be thought of as limiting legal
solutions to those that match in some way the value of its impact.
The concept is one that connotes restraint so that legal solutions are
not overly restrictive. The principle has deep roots in European law
and has inspired sophisticated assessments of the proper meaning
and application.186 The concept is often associated with balancing
competing rights or interests,187 and judicial review.188
183

TEU, supra note 20, at art. 5. See also 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 207, https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c382f65d-618a-4c72-91351e68087499fa.0006.02/DOC_4&format=PDF [https://perma.cc/7R4D-ZWJE]
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (outlining
the need for a means for securing respect both principles).
184
2012 O.J. (C 326), at 207.
185
TEU, supra note 20, at art. 5.
186
Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality, 10
Dartmouth L.J. 1 (2012) (examining the history of the principle of proportionality
from Aristotle to contemporary law); Audrey Guinchard, Taking Proportionality
Seriously: The Use of Contextual Integrity for a More Informed and Transparent
Analysis in EU Data Protection Law, 24 EUR. L.J. 434(2018) (building on the
framework of contextual integrity to create a systematic method of evaluating and
implementing proportionality in EU data protection law).
187
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS 235 (2012) (examining the necessity and utility of proportionality).
188
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism¸ 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 86–88 (2008-09) (describing
how courts avoid declaring one right as absolute in contrast with competing rights
by moving into balancing interests through the lens of proportionality); Vikki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3136–53 (2015) (arguing for a moderate increase in proportionality analysis in
U.S. Constitutional review and exploring specifically how it might serve in First
Amendment cases).
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Recital 4 of the GDPR addresses proportionality in describing
data protection as a qualified right. The protection of personal data
“is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its
function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights,
in accordance with the principle of proportionality.”189 In fact,
Recital 4 highlights the need to also protect several other rights that
tend to compete with data protection, including freedom of
expression and information as well as freedom to conduct a
business.190
Because data protection and privacy are commonly in conflict
with expression and information access, proportionality is an
important and perhaps intuitively useful tool for evaluating whether
a balance is appropriate. The ECJ decision reflects attention to
proportionality in declining to require broad territoriality in the
particular context of erasure claims at issues in Google LLC v. CNIL.
Much of the subsidiarity described in the prior Section addresses
EU Member States’ requirements to conduct proportionality tests in
applying Article 17 erasure rights to particular cases and in passing
laws under Article 85 to address national standards for balancing
data protection with expression and information rights. The two
principles may be intertwined in many contexts but certainly are in
conversation in data protection in recognition of national variation
in cultural norms and in particular case impacts. Because of these
principles and norms, the GDPR actually contains support for
tipping the scales away from data protection when needed to protect
expression and information. The Google LLC v. CNIL decision
highlights this restraint in data protection.
In the United States, these EU accommodations of expression
and information in the context of the GDPR may be
underappreciated. In general, the impression in the United States is
that the GDPR created data protection that overly burdens rights of
expression and information that are similar to First Amendment

189

The GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 4.
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights includes the freedom to
conduct a business as one of the protected liberties in the same section of the
Charter as data protection. The Charter, supra note 14, at art. 16.
190
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freedoms of speech and of the press.191 The ECJ acknowledged in
the Google LLC v. CNIL decision that countries around the world
may place different emphases on the relative weight of the freedom
of expression.192 But this acknowledged comparative difference in
the value placed on expression may create an exaggerated
conception of the EU’s preference for data protection. The Google
LLC v. CNIL decision and the text of the GDPR itself provide
evidence that expression and information rights are still valued
under the EU model for data protection. Even in this strong and
detailed data protection regulation, significant accommodation
remains for these competing interests.
In the United States, the protections for speech and for the press
are similar to the rights of expression and information in the
European Union. Judicial review of burdens on these Constitutional
rights in the United States is complex and arguably hides
proportionality analysis that is actually being employed.193 The tide
may be turning towards scholarly acceptance of proportionality
analysis in U.S. Constitutional law.194 However, in the context of
data protection or privacy law, objections to proportionality
assessments on a case-by-case basis are likely to target a lack of
predictability for both rights holders and information users.
Predictability and risk management are a significant part of the

191
Mike Masnick, Dear Europe: Please Don’t Kill Free Speech in the Name of
‘Privacy Protection’, TECHDIRT (May 8, 2017) (arguing that the EU right to be
forgotten could lead to over-restriction of speech). See Amy Gajda, Privacy,
Press, and the Right to be Forgotten in the United States, 93 WASH. L. REV. 201,
264 (2018) (highlighting examples of erasure-like protections in U.S. law and
warning that the United States must determine how to “cabin a Right to Be
Forgotten effectively with a way that strongly and nearly always support press
freedoms”).
192
Case C-507/17, Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et
des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 60 (Sept. 24, 2019) (judgment).
193
See Jackson, supra note 188; Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech:
From “Posts-as-Trumps” to Proportionality & Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3679607
[https://perma.cc/Y2WW-4B6H].
194
See Jackson, supra note 186.
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debate in the United States regarding new federal privacy
legislation.195
Whether or not proportionality is itself transferable to the United
States, the lesson from Google LLC v. CNIL may be to recognize the
EU data protection model is not a set of requirements that inflexibly
favors data protection over competing rights. The GDPR actually
provides protections that are strong but qualified, with some
balancing incorporated and some deferred. The result is a law that
can accommodate evolving data uses and norms. As the United
States struggles to find the appropriate and predictable balance for
potential federal privacy legislation, the EU example can serve as
fair warning that some questions will require ongoing consideration
through either courts or other processes such as regulatory action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Google LLC v. CNIL delivered a somewhat surprising modesty
of territorial scope for the erasure rights at issue in internet personal
name searches. The ECJ judgment surfaces the GDPR’s features of
decentralization and ongoing balancing of the qualified right of data
protection with expression and information rights. While the Court
left a number of questions unanswered in its reasoning, subsidiarity
and proportionality are evident in the decision.
As the United States considers the GDPR as a touchstone for
broad new federal legislation, these two moderating concepts should
reshape the U.S. understanding of the influential EU example. This
EU regulation is not the uniform static set of protections that some
assume. The United States should also take a measured approach to
both preemption and to the feasibility of thoroughly anticipating
how to balance privacy with competing interests. The United States
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understandable desire for a single national set of rules to follow.”); David
Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia Carter, The Right to Obscurity: How We Can
Implement the Google Spain Decision, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 437, 477–80 (2016)
(advocating for the creation of a Global Internet Obscurity Center to guide search
engines challenged by the need to balance expression and information rights with
requests under the EU right to be forgotten).
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should note that the EU legislative process took four years and has
been described as “tortuous.” Deciding on the best allocation of
authority and on the level of information privacy or data protection
is likely to be no easier in the United States than in the European
Union.196
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years of passage of the GDPR as “tortuous,” “accompanied by aggressive
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